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Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of
Democracy
A Reply to Four Critics
Neil Walker
Introduction
In this short comment I cannot do justice to the full range of arguments made in
the four written responses to my original paper1 by Stefan Rummens, Morag
Goodwin, Wouter Werner and Leonard Besselink, still less to all the issues raised
in the broader discussion of our various contributions at the Leiden seminar. I
have greatly benefited from the various written and oral exchanges, and am
indebted to all concerned for their insights and helpful pointers to future
research. For present purposes, however, I intend to concentrate on a few key
areas of my argument which my respondents subjected to close scrutiny, and
where, therefore, I feel it is most incumbent upon me to defend, clarify, and, as
need be, develop or qualify my earlier thoughts.
In particular, I want to address four points. A first concerns whether my approach
is biased in its discussion of the relative standing of constitutionalism and
democracy, tending to take the meaning and authority of the former for granted
and concentrating its critical attention unduly on the incompleteness of democ-
racy. A second and related point concerns my scepticism about the capacity of the
idea and practice of democracy to supply its own resources in the development of
just forms of political organization. A third, and, again, closely connected point
concerns the overall relationship between democracy and constitutionalism, and
whether I am correct in characterizing this as a ‘double relationship’,2 involving
both mutual support and mutual tension. A fourth and last point is less a reply to
specific lines of criticism and more an attempt to emphasize the broader import
of my argument. It is concerned with how the deeper philosophical concerns
raised by my approach and the conceptual reframing they prompt are important
not just as an explanatory and evaluative window on the evolving configuration
of political relations but also as an expression of that evolution, and with how
this new conceptual frame might condition how we approach the question of a
democracy-sensitive institutional architecture for the global age.
1 N. Walker, Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship,
referred to as Walker, Constitutionalism, in subsequent footnotes.
2 Walker, Constitutionalism, 206.
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1 Rebalancing Democracy and Constitutionalism
Stefan Rummens, who is my sternest and most directly engaged critic on this
point as on others, detects a ‘one-sidedness, and thus, weakness’ in my compara-
tive treatment of constitutionalism and democracy.3 This is partly about my
alleged failure to appreciate and exploit the full potential of democracy, to which I
return below. But it is also about a perceived blindness or inattention on my part
to the limitations and pitfalls of constitutionalism. Commenting on my preoccu-
pation with what I view to be the empirical and normative shortcomings of
democracy, Rummens asserts that ‘many of the forms of [democratic] incom-
pleteness identified by Walker refer to forms of contingency which indeed haunt
democracy but which, contra Walker, similarly haunt constitutionalism’.4 The
message seems to be that I am letting constitutionalism off too lightly, and that if
I were to apply the same critical standards to it as I do to democracy, then consti-
tutionalism’s weaknesses would be starkly exposed and it would be much harder
to justify according it the kind of prominence that I do.
I believe this criticism to be based on a misunderstanding of the way in which I
conceive of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy in the
modern age. The very basis of that conception is that ‘the values expressed by and
through democracy are undoubtedly of central importance’ to the political forms
of mature modernity, and that recent constitutional thought and practice, where
previously it had treated democracy as a marginal concern, has been required to
acknowledge and respond to that new centrality.5 Modern constitutionalism,
indeed, I seek to argue, is defined in terms of its relationship to democracy, either
helping to realize democracy or qualifying and supplementing it, and in so doing
assuming rather than challenging democracy’s centrality. In a fundamental sense,
then, modern constitutionalism has become dependent upon, even parasitic upon
the political forms and imperatives of democracy.
This is true, moreover, not only in normative and instrumental terms – with con-
stitutional thought and practice involved in the enterprise of making the best
moral and institutional sense of democracy, but also in ideological terms. Where I
remark that ‘[d]emocratic incompleteness … remains both the main justificatory
foundation for contemporary constitutionalism and the main reason why that
justificatory foundation remains inherently fragile’, I am alluding to the paradoxi-
cal sense in which democracy’s weakness, as well as being constitutionalism’s
opportunity, in the final analysis is also constitutionalism’s weakness. For consti-
tutionalism in the mature modern age has no higher cultural (or moral) resources
to draw upon than democracy itself in seeking to supply the deficiencies of
democracy; and, as the recent example of the failed European Union constitution
demonstrates, the constitutional way always risks popular embarrassment to the
extent that it cannot plausibly point to some kind of democratic or meta-demo-
cratic warrant for its proposals.
3 Rummens, in this issue, 256.
4 Rummens, in this issue, 277.
5 Walker, Constitutionalism, 206.
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The fact that constitutionalism, in my analytical framework, is defined and justi-
fied as seeking to address the incompleteness of democracy is not, therefore, born
of any conviction that constitutionalism be somehow elevated above democracy
in the firmament of political morality. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that
democracy simply cannot by itself answer all the questions it raises about the
appropriate framing and practice of politics. And it is a tribute to the magnetic
pull of democracy in the high modern age that the other key political languages
and technologies of the modern age, such as constitutionalism, are most appro-
priately characterized by the contribution they make within democracy’s prob-
lem-solving orbit.
None of this means, of course, that the deficiencies and incompleteness of consti-
tutionalism should not also be interrogated. As noted above, I am criticized for
failing to appreciate that contingency haunts constitutionalism as much as it does
democracy. In fact, however, from the very outset I acknowledge that the ‘neces-
sity’ in principle of constitutionalism as an accompaniment to democracy is
matched by the ‘contingency’ of constitutionalism’s content.6 Granted, I do not
then proceed to subject that contingent content to close critical attention, but
only because that was not the focal point of my article. For the record, I readily
agree that anything that presents itself as constitutional thought and practice
does not just on that basis acquire any special epistemic, moral or other privilege
that renders it immune from normal protocols of justification or standards of cri-
tique. This holds whatever dimension of constitutional thought and practice we
are referring to: whether we are talking about the older legacy of constitutional-
ism, concerned with the limitation of government power in terms of individual
rights and other collective goods;7 or the more recent concern with the ‘constitu-
tion’ of democracy, and so with the ways in which constitutional thought and
practice has addressed the democracy-realizing functions of authorship, stake-
holding, representation, competence etc.; or, indeed, with any deeper premises of
political morality that may be common to democracy and constitutionalism, of
which more later.
I also accept, however, that the question of critical emphasis is much more than
mere academic nit-picking, but has real political significance. As Morag Goodwin
develops in her telling and wide-ranging critique of the increasing use of the pur-
portedly universal discourse of human rights in global constitutionalism as ‘place-
takers’ rather than simply ‘place-holders’ for democracy,8 often some kind of spe-
cial privilege does seem to attach to ideas perpetrated within a constitutional regis-
6 Walker, in this issue, Constitutionalism, 206.
7 Wouter Werner in his response wants to define constitutionalism only in terms of the limitation
of government power (in this issue, 269). However, this, I believe, is unnecessarily restrictive,
treating one particular aspect – once predominant – of constitutional thought as the whole. I
acknowledge, however, in response to Werner and also to Rummens – who is more explicit in his
criticism of my failure to define constitutionalism closely (in this issue, 262), that I should have
made it clearer that in my terms constitutionalism refers to all choices and acts and justifications
of choices and acts made in a constitutional vernacular, regardless of whether these are con-
cerned with the limitative or the constitutive part of constitutionalism.
8 Goodwin, in this issue, 246.
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ter. As a matter of political practice, both nationally and (increasingly) transnatio-
nally, constitutional thought is often invoked as an argument-stopper – a way of
silencing debate and of providing a cover of false dignity and moral authority for
the contingency of particular interests and forms of political expediency. The rea-
sons for constitutionalism’s epistemic arrogance are many, ranging from the sur-
faces of political thought – the way in which in countless different modern set-
tings purveyors of constitutional ideas have tended to trade heavily on the
authority of established constitutional practice – to its depths - the enduring leg-
acy of the complex historical link between foundational modes of thought and the
idea of a settled frame of social and political life. But none of these reasons are
justifications for constitutional imperialism, and Goodwin’s essay is a telling
reminder of the need to be clear about the dangers of just such an imperialism.
As I have said, my own approach to modern constitutionalism seeks to accord it a
more modest, democracy-respecting role, and therefore, as Goodwin herself
seems to accept, that approach cannot be a direct target of her critique of consti-
tutionalism as a self-affirming and self-expanding container of rights universal-
ism. Yet she is surely right to sound her more general warning about the capacity
of a certain type of democracy-challenging, rights-centred constitutional dis-
course to continue to draw upon a potent early modern legacy of suspicious con-
tainment of public power in order similarly to constrain public power in its late
modern transnational forums. And in sounding that warning she is also caution-
ing that wherever we invoke the language of constitutionalism, even when we
intend to achieve the opposite, we risk giving comfort to democracy-marginaliz-
ing forces, and so should be ever vigilant of that danger.
2 The Limits of Democracy
Even if I do not place too much faith in constitutionalism, do I perhaps place too
little faith in democracy? Rummens argues that this is the case, and in particular
that I ‘underestimate the reflexivity of the democratic process and the way in
which it is able to shape its own conditions of possibility.’9 The nub of his criti-
cism is that I concentrate too much on the inability of democratic theory to deter-
mine the course and content of democracy, and in so doing neglect the ways in
which democratic practice, reflexively and iteratively conceived, ‘constantly aims
to improve the conditions necessary for its functioning’.10 On this view, ‘an inclu-
sive democratic procedure’ is a valuable, indeed necessary, ‘complement’11 to both
democratic and constitutional theory, in that it is able to take account of specific
historical circumstances and local considerations in a way that does much to over-
come the incompleteness of general theory.
I readily concede that I concentrate more on the limitations of democratic theory
than on those of democratic practice. These theoretical limitations, I stress, are
9 Rummens, in this issue, 263.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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born not of ‘a lack … but a surfeit’12 of available materials. So it is not the case
that the theoretical landscape we observe when addressing questions of author-
ship, stakeholding, representation and basic democracy-realizing capacity and
competence is a barren one. Rather, there are rich intellectual resources to draw
upon, and we can certainly hope that the reflexive conversation of democracy
does indeed draw upon them in adjusting its conditions of possibility in a consis-
tently ‘democratically’ sensitive manner. But we cannot guarantee that the demo-
cratic process will in fact operate in an optimally or even generally democratically
sensitive manner, and this is so not just because we cannot guarantee anything in
our prediction of the actual workings of democracy (as opposed to our conceptual
elaboration of its highest forms). For there is the additional danger, which I point
to on a number of occasions,13 that the democratic process operates in a path-
dependent manner so as to reinforce rather than correct its existing biases. If a
political system already has one conception of stakeholding, one framework of
representation, one model of democracy-prerequisite rights, then the very ways
in which that political system mobilizes decision-making opinion may tend to
underscore rather than modify and correct any bias in these existing structures.
Of course, we should be careful not to overestimate the significance of original
constitutional sin. Rummens himself readily concedes that, in a backward-looking
perspective, there is a ‘more fundamental contingency which marks constitution-
alism and democracy alike’,14 but would nevertheless want to concentrate more
on the forward-looking potential of democracy to remake itself – infinite progress
as an antidote to infinite regress. Leonard Besselink, too, urges that we concen-
trate less on constitutive bias and more on the ‘redemptive power of historical
reception’.15 Yet the fact remains that particular democracies can and sometimes
do entrench their own particular limitations – and, indeed, in some ways the his-
torically ‘redeemed’ and settled polity is less likely than the unredeemed and con-
sistently challenged polity to be democratically self-critical. Surely, then it is one
of the tasks of democratic thought, and so also of constitutional thought in its
important democracy-realizing mode, to think about the kinds of struc-
tures – inclusive constitutional amendment procedures, referendums, extra-
institutional dialogue mechanisms, involvement of non-nationals in constitu-
tional courts or other review mechanisms (such as Truth and Reconciliation proc-
esses), guaranteed routes of progressive political autonomy for groups passing
certain thresholds of collective self-articulation etc. – which might act as a consis-
tent counterpoint to inherent biases in any particular form of constitutional
democracy, and about how these countervailing structures might be introduced,
maintained and applied against existing biases. If we like, we can still characterize
this as the democratic practice and procedure ‘complementing’ and supplement-
ing democratic theory, just as long as we are aware that there is nothing pure and
self-legitimating about the democratic practice itself, and that without resort to
12 Walker, Constitutionalism, 219.
13 Walker, Constitutionalism, 214-219.
14 Rummens, in this issue, 264.
15 Besselink, in this issue, 238.
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these sorts of self-correcting structures and ideas it will lack the necessary
capacity for reflexivity.
3 Relating Democracy and Constitutionalism
What of my insistence on the double relationship between democracy and consti-
tutionalism? Here my position is threatened on either flank. It is challenged both
from the perspective which questions whether, alongside the mutual tension,
there is any significant aspect of mutual support in the relationship between
democracy and constitutionalism; and from the opposite perspective which ques-
tions whether, alongside the mutual support, there is any significant aspect of
mutual tension in the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism. In
seeking from their different starting points to eliminate or marginalize one limb
of the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism, these two posi-
tions instantiate just that ‘singular’ conception of the connection between democ-
racy and constitutionalism whose conventional historical wisdom I criticize in the
introductory section of my article.16 But does either of these new versions of an
old argument hit the mark in their critique of my position?
The position that democracy and constitutionalism remain in tension, with little
evidence of mutual dependence, is put forward by Wouter Werner. On the one
hand, he argues, democracy does not require constitutionalism for its democracy-
realizing functions (as opposed to its democracy-qualifying functions), but rather
certain constitutive or foundational acts and arrangements.17 However, our dis-
agreement here seems to be definitional rather than substantive, flowing from
Werner’s preference to restrict constitutionalism to the democracy-qualifying or
democracy-supplementing idea of limited government.18 If, against that restric-
ted conception, one accepts my argument of the previous section that whatever
frames the democratic condition is not just the naked contingency of the original
settlement or the virtuous flow of democratic practice, but is itself susceptible to
a process of ongoing consideration and examination under the theoretical light of
constitutional democracy, then constitutionalism, now more widely conceived
than under Werner’s definition, is reintroduced as an important functional pre-
condition of democracy.
On the other hand, Werner argues that constitutionalism, and in particular trans-
national constitutionalism as it has emerged in the global age, does not need
democracy. Here, our difference cannot be so easily resolved by definitional flexi-
bility. For Werner, there are deep questions of authority that remain unanswered
at the international and transnational level, and indeed much that passes for
postnational constitutionalism is a project without an identifiable author, still
less a democratically legitimate one. Moreover, within the complex archipelago of
transnational ‘constitutional’ regimes, questions of stakeholding and demarca-
tion also tend to defy democratic treatment. Who is and who is not a member,
16 Walker, Constitutionalism, 208.
17 Werner, in this issue, 268.
18 See n. 2 above.
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and where one regime end and the next one begins, are deeply complex questions
where democratic theory and practice, certainly as distilled from the state tradi-
tion, is of little help. Yet, while I sympathize with much of Werner’s diagnosis of
the difficulties of introducing democracy at the transnational level, I am less con-
vinced by his conclusions. That international constitutionalism should concen-
trate on ‘civilizing politics through legal constraints’19 as in the early modern
counter-absolutist variant of state constitutionalism; that more accountability is
perhaps the only available surrogate for absent democracy; and that, as Jan
Klabbers has suggested, the democratization of the proliferating functional
regimes of the transnational order, even to the extent that it might be successful,
should be looked on with scepticism as tending to encourage either fragmenta-
tion and regime collision or the assertion of new hegemonies of the (relatively)
democratically virtuous, strikes me as an excessively gloomy set of conclusions.
Certainly, Werner is correct to urge that democratic rhetoric is not enough and
that we need ‘a frank recognition that the incompleteness of democracy and con-
stitutionalism can never be fully remedied’.20 Yet I also concur with Rummens
that we should not, even in full awareness of the manifold practical difficulties of
democratic implementation, be too quick to accept a sub-democratic ‘second best’
in postnational constitutional arrangements.21 And in so doing I am reminded
that the alternative to the sometimes crude blandishments and premature or
exaggerated boasts of democratic rhetoric is not necessarily a brave new world of
regulatory candour but, as Goodwin, argues, the even more dangerous seduction
of rights-talk.
In the final analysis, the world of post-state democracy will always be partial,
overstated, unevenly distributed, and divisive. Yet so too is the world of state
democracy whose establishment, I stress in my introduction, is itself so recent
and fragile,22 certainly more so than either certain ‘nostalgic’ state constitutional-
ists pining for its golden years or certain ‘triumphalist’ postnational constitution-
alists impatient to move beyond its exhausted paradigm care to factor into their
analysis.23 And just as the imperfections and imperfectability of state democracy
have never been good reasons for downgrading its continuing value, so too the
imperfections and imperfectability of transnational democracy do not supply
good reason for marginalizing its role and potential in the constitution of global
political relations. Moreover, as we shall pursue in the concluding section below,
the question of what counts as a democratically adequate, or permissibly im-
perfect, constitutional architecture for the global age is not just a practical ques-
tion of finding the right tools for the task but, first and foremost, a conceptual
question of working out what the task now is. And from that new perspective, the
19 Werner, in this issue, 272.
20 Ibid., 275.
21 Walker, Constitutionalism, 22.
22 Walker, Constitutionalism, 209-210.
23 See M. Kumm, The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Between Constitutional Triumphalism
and Nostalgia, in: P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford:
OUP 2010, p. 201-219.
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state tradition of democratic architecture is not so much an inaccessible or un-
realistically high standard to apply to the global age as an inappropriate one.
If Werner’s concerns that the basis of mutual support of democracy and constitu-
tionalism is becoming inexorably eroded under conditions of globalization can be
answered, what of the opposite critique of my double relationship thesis? Accord-
ing to Rummens, the link between democracy and constitutionalism is more ‘sin-
gularly complementary’ than I appreciate.24 So, for him, it is the oppositional
rather than the supportive limb of my dual relationship that should be discarded,
and with it my sense that there is a democracy-qualifying and supplementing
dimension of constitutionalism alongside the various democracy-realizing dimen-
sions. In part, this argument connects back to Rummens’ attempt to secure a
more encompassing role for democratic practice, but it cuts deeper than that. It
bases itself more fundamentally on the argument of Habermas – and, more dis-
tantly – of Claude Lefort about the co-originality of public autonomy and private
autonomy – and so of democracy and constitutionalism – in the making of politi-
cal modernity.
In advancing this argument Rummens is quite correct to point out that I do not
do full justice to the Habermasian line of thought in my own account. As he
lucidly demonstrates, I am too quick to dismiss the co-originality thesis as a the-
sis about mutual causality, and therefore as reducible to an argument that is per-
ennially vulnerable to the empirical counter instance where private autonomy
does not in fact support public autonomy and vice-versa. In my haste to find a
stylized ‘third way’ of singularity beyond those which place either constitutional-
ism or democracy normatively ‘on top’ I neglect to give due consideration to
forms of normative (rather than simply empirical) connection between democ-
racy and constitutionalism that do not depend upon the full subservience of one
to the other. And, as Rummens, reminds us, through his idea of co-originality
Habermas posits just such a deeper normative connection between democracy
and constitutionalism – of which the empirical connection is just a trace – at two
levels. First, there is a connection in terms of mutual presupposition, and sec-
ondly there is connection by reference to a common source. Let me now say
something about these two levels, and in so doing seek to demonstrate why, even
on this more appropriately rounded consideration of his work, I would still resist
the full import of the Habermasian complementarity thesis, and why the vulnera-
bility of a causal and so empirically falsifiable account of interdependence contin-
ues to be a factor in that resistance.
The mutual presupposition thesis concerns the ways in which the full realization
of the ideals of democracy (public autonomy) depends upon the full realization of
the ideals of constitutionalism (private autonomy), and vice versa. This is in some
measure concerned with the well-known instrumental and functional links
between individual rights and democracy, and so covers much the same ground as
my own analysis of the democracy-realizing constitutional dimension of compe-
tence. More deeply, and more originally, constitutionalism as private autonomy is
also deemed to be prerequisite to democracy in the sense that the modernist
24 Rummens, in this issue, 257.
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eschewal of transcendental forms of political authority and the emergence in its
place of an ideal of collective self-rule, collectively self-committed – and so of
democracy all the way down – necessarily presupposes the rejection of any form
of externally imposed authority, and hence the endorsement of individual free-
dom for all. Reciprocally, moreover, individual freedom presupposes democracy
to the extent that the realization of individual freedom demands acknowledg-
ment of individuals’ privileged access to their own needs and preferences, which
can only be secured by a system in which all individuals acquire and retain (or can
recover) voice in the political process.
In turn, for Rummens and Habermas, as also for Lefort, the mutual presupposi-
tion of democracy and constitutionalism can be further accounted for in their
common origins in the moral horizon of modernity. Here, Rummens’ position
comes close to my own. Whether we take our deep historical sociology of knowl-
edge, from Habermas, or, as I prefer, from Charles Taylor (or, as Leonard Besse-
link prefers, from Kant himself),25 we arrive at a position where the attainment of
the horizon of modernity is about the emergence of a deep social imaginary and
moral order associated with individualism, egalitarianism, constructivism and
progressivism and its replacement of an earlier imaginary based upon the accept-
ance of an externally authorized order of human and other relations.
Rummens fully acknowledges the similarity of our positions in this regard, and,
indeed, uses this as a peg on which to hang his criticism of my insistence on
retaining a dimension of mutual tension in the relationship between democracy
and constitutionalism. ‘It seems prima facie puzzling’, he argues, ‘that [demo-
cratic and constitutional] practices that are meant to implement and realize these
[same] values in society should find themselves in an oppositional stance towards
one another’.26 In the face of that challenge, how can I hold to this position, and
how can I resist, in this respect, the mutual presupposition thesis which, for Rum-
mens, so closely complements the common moral horizon thesis?
My answer to that twin challenge is in part epistemological and in part practical.
In my elaboration of the case for the normative incompleteness of democracy,
and of the possibility of its being supplemented and even qualified by other indi-
vidual rights and public goods, I am at pains to point out that I am not claiming
that ‘the kinds of constitutional claims which might and frequently are made on
behalf of such [putatively non-democratic] individual and collective values … are
necessarily additional to or inconsistent with democracy’.27 Instead, I am merely
concerned to assert a negative proposition – that we simply cannot be sure either
way. There is no ground upon which we can say with absolute conviction that the
values associated with constitutionalism and democracy hang together, just as
there is not ground upon which we can say with absolute conviction that they do
not. Certainly, if democracy itself should be the umpire – the deep epistemologi-
cal standard – then there is no broad consensus ‘out there’ about the singular
complementarity of democracy and constitutionalism. This is not to say that the
25 Besselink, in this issue, 241.
26 Rummens, in this issue, 258.
27 Walker, Constitutionalism, 221.
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mutual presupposition thesis of Habermas and Rummens is an unattractive one,
or that the symbiotic relationship of public and private autonomy is not one that
we should be striving to ‘make real’ in our social and political relations. But that is
a different thing from saying that its is the truth or, if you prefer, the objectively-
grounded best understanding of the matter. It is neither invulnerable as an
empirical thesis nor consensually grounded as matter of social epistemology.
Rather, it is just one more contentious, and itself democratically non-validated,
theory about our best understanding of democracy. So it would, in my view, be
democratically (or meta-democratically) unwarranted to ‘close off options by (the
deeply controversial) definitional fiat’ that the strong version of the co-originality
thesis would ordain. Instead, we should ‘hold open the putative category of non-
democratic values’28 and refuse to relinquish the alternative possibility of there
being an irreducible tension between them and the values of democracy.
The same argument can be pursued in a more concrete vein. The practice of con-
stitutional law, and in particular constitutional adjudication, is replete with hard
cases where we have to balance, reconcile and sometime trade off different val-
ues, including those values we associate with democracy on the one hand, and
with other constitutionally familiar individual right and public goods less readily
or directly associated with democracy on the other. Some, such as Dworkin, hold
on to the possibility of one right answer in this process of reconciliation, but even
for Dworkin this is often a distant aspiration – a regulative ideal rather than a
tangible prospect. As Waldron, argues, and as most constitutional thinkers and
practitioners would at least tacitly accept, in the face of epistemological uncer-
tainty, the exalted standard of moral objectivity and the possibility of one right
answer, or – at one remove – even of a single scheme or formula for finding the
right answer, are simply beside the point. Rather, our legal and moral discourse
should be more pragmatically framed, our answers always partial rather than
complete, provisional rather than final, approximate rather than exact, persua-
sive rather than compelling.29
Tellingly, for those working within the Habermasian tradition too, there seems to
be recognition of a deep tension between different constitutional values and prin-
ciples at the level of their application to particular cases. Indeed, famously, Robert
Alexy – the leading disciple of discourse ethics in legal theory – has come to differ
with Habermas himself over the right way to reconcile individual rights and other
collective goods in pursuit of the project of constitutional democracy. For Alexy,
all disputes can be addressed through weighing and balancing competing princi-
ples in light of the particular circumstances,30 whereas for Habermas, certain pri-
vate-autonomy focused, democracy-realizing right are considered too important
to be fed into the discursive process and should instead be absolutely protected
by a constitutional firewall.31 One can see the force of both arguments. According
28 Ibid., 15.
29 J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford: OUP 1999, chapter 8; see also J. Tully, Public Philoso-
phy in a New Key: Vol. II Imperialism and Civic Freedom, Cambridge: CUP 2008.
30 R. Alexy (trans. J. Rivers), A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: OUP 2002, p. 388 et seq.
31 J. Habermas (trans. W. Rehg), Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge: CUP 1996, p. 254-59.
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to Alexy, we should trust in the public reason of the Constitutional Court to rec-
ognize and to find the deep mutual compatibility of the various democracy-rele-
vant constitutional principles, whereas for Habermas this would be a step too far,
jeopardizing the stability of the very conditions of discursive will formation.
The immediate point is not to seek to adjudicate between these views or dismiss
either as unreasonable, but merely to note that even from within the camp of
communicative ethics and of democratic constitutionalism conceived of as a proj-
ect of deep complementarity, hard choices remain about how to reconcile differ-
ent fundamental values and principles – differences which tend to remain coded
in terms of democratic and other ‘constitutional’ rights. So deep are the unrecon-
ciled differences, indeed, that it seems impossible to find intra-school agreement
even on the correct general methodology and formula for finding the right
answer, still less on what the right answer should be in any particular case.
All this is to say that at the cutting edge of constitutional discourse the correct
balance between the sorts of goods associated with democracy and other sorts of
goods is bound to remain controversial, and we need to make due allowance for
this in our broader theoretical contemplation of the relationship between democ-
racy and constitutionalism. That is what my argument about the double character
of the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism seeks to do. And
that argument, in conclusion, is not contradicted by Rummens’ deeper point
about the common horizons of modernity. It seems to me perfectly possible to
recognize a certain ensemble of values, presumptions, orientations etc., as being
distinctive of modernity, without drawing the further conclusion that these
should in principle, still less in detailed application, be reconcilable within a single
vision. Rather, as I tried to suggest in the concluding section of my main article,
there seems to be a clear and irresoluble tension within modernity between a
deep ‘second order’ commitment to the realization, however best achieved, of the
value cluster of individualism, equality and collectively designed and self-
informed progress on the one hand, and a ‘first order’ commitment to the demo-
cratic process as the optimal medium for the achievement of these ends. That is
why, ultimately, I see the relationship of democracy and constitutionalism as a
‘combination of mutual inextricability and mutual tension’,32 and why both the
theory and the practice of constitutional democracy is ‘ceaselessly controversial’.
It is also the reason why Charles Taylor can insist that, from within the moral
horizon of modernity, it is our destiny to construct not one best vision, but rather
‘multiple modernities’.33
4 The Architecture of Global Constitutionalism
In conclusion, let me return briefly to the question of what a democratically ade-
quate architecture of global constitutionalism might look like, and how the very
32 Walker, Constitutionalism, 231.
33 C. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham: Duke University 2004, p. 195.
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conceptual tools with which we address this question may themselves be under-
going transformation.
In a valuable set of insights, Leonard Besselink takes me gently to task in his com-
ment for failing, in my attempt to cover a very large terrain, to be insufficiently
sensitive to difference and nuance in both the temporal and spatial dimension of
constitutional development. Temporally, he points out that my account of the
rise of the democratic imperative in modern constitutionalism rather overstates
the break between this mature phase and the early modern constitutional assault
on absolutism.34 The early monarchomach literature to which Besselink refers,
and indeed the social contract literature which followed on from it, was con-
cerned with containing political power within law understood quite broadly,
including legal rules of legitimate leadership succession or qualification as well as
legal rules protecting the rights of individual and other substantive values. In
other words, from the very outset, there was something proto-democratic about
the constitutional impulse to contain power. Besselink’s deeper purpose here is
both to counsel against an unduly rigid periodization of constitutional history
and, of more immediate importance, to alert us to the fact that even in its most
ostensibly legalist mode, constitutionalism as containment inevitably raises ques-
tions of democratic legitimacy. Similarly, to return to the global age of constitu-
tionalism, for Besselink, here echoing Goodwin, no matter its claims to ‘quasi-
universality or cosmopolitanism’35 constitutionalism as the containment of
power always also refers to its containment within a particular locale, and so
inevitably always also raises and is bound in some sense to respond to the kind of
democracy-realizing constitutional questions which are so well-known to state
constitutionalism. In other words, whatever its self-presentation, global constitu-
tionalism cannot deny its democratic dimension, and the questions of legitimacy
associated with this.
In spatial terms, too, Besselink seeks to qualify my historical analysis. He makes
the point that alongside the kind of foundational, documentary constitutional-
ism, with its emphasis upon revolution, exclusivity and ‘sovereigntist thought’36
which I treat as paradigmatic, there is an alternative tradition of incremental con-
stitutionalism, one which ‘codifies rather than modifies’,37 of which the prototype
is the British constitution, but which is also exemplified in the Dutch tradition,
and – interestingly, from a global context – in the contemporary case of the non-
state EU. Besselink proceeds to argue that not just incremental constitutions thus
narrowly understood, but, in fact, all constitutions manifest certain incremental
tendencies. All constitutions are implicated in an unending process of self-com-
pletion, one in which they are influenced as much by considerations of contextual
effectiveness and the demands of new circumstances as they are by the legacy of
original or inherited form. The point of this analysis is, once again, to counsel
against viewing the emerging global constitutionalism as too distinct from the
34 Besselink, in this issue, 235-236.
35 Ibid., 243.
36 Ibid., 236.
37 Walker, Constitutionalism, 207.
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constitutional past. His message is that some state constitutional traditions of
the non-foundational sort find it easier to contemplate the constitutionalization
of the networked space of global society than is commonly supposed, and even
the classical foundational traditions are more adaptable than their own declared
wisdom (and our received wisdom) allows.
So Besselink reminds us, on the one hand, of the inescapability in principle of
democratic concerns in any constitutional vision, and, on the other hand, of the
variability, malleability and adaptability of the state constitutional tradition. If
we take these comments together they reinforce my sense of the plasticity and
impermanence of the state-centred architecture, and its insufficiency as a way of
thinking about the proper relationship between democracy and constitutionalism
in the global age. For all that in their immediacy and extended prominence over
the modern age (pre-democratic and democratic), key state-centred architectural
considerations – including sovereign autonomy, the mutual exclusivity of polities,
the horizontalization of the public/private distinction within a single self-con-
tained polity, and the replicability of the state form as a kind of uniform ‘polity’
template – have tended to dominate discussion of constitutional possibilities, it is
the moral-imaginary dimension that remains fundamental to modernity and its
prospects. The architectural framework, and the dominant language of conceptu-
alization predicated on that architectural framework is, finally, just one means to
the end of a social cosmology that privileges equality, autonomy and collective
design and self-steering.
The constitutional question, then for a global age, is how both to generate and to
adapt to a new architecture to help pursue these same deep ends. That is to say,
faced with functionally limited rather than territorially sovereign polities; with
overlapping rather than exclusive domains of authority; with a specification for
any individual of her relevant public domain and domain of protected private
freedom, and of the demarcation between these domains, that stretches across
many polities rather than being contained within one; and with an increasingly
variability and non-replicability of polity forms, how do we modify and optimize
the democratic impulse – still at base just the latest iteration of the basic ideal of
government by act of the people – alongside the remainder of our inheritance of
constitutional ideas and doctrine, so as to revive the best and banish the worst of
our modernist tradition? This is a huge question. And it is one which, as already
noted, involves freeing our very language of conceptualization – including our
notions of authorship, of stakeholding, of representation, of capacity, of bounda-
ries, of public goods – of the assumptions and predispositions associated with a
certain type of state-centred architectural backdrop. It is also one, I would wager,
that we will be better equipped to address if we continue to view democracy, how-
ever renewed, as a vital but empirically and normatively incomplete ideal situated
in a double relationship of mutual tension and support with constitutionalism.
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